We contribute to a growing literature on redistribution and identity. We propose a theoretical model that embeds social identity concerns, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), with inequity averse preferences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We conduct an artefactual ultimatum game experiment with registered members of British political parties for whom both identity and redistribution are salient. The empirical results are as follows. (1) Proposers and responders demonstrate ingroup-favoritism. (2) Proposers exhibit quantitatively stronger social identity effects relative to responders. (3) As redistributive taxes increase, offers by proposers and the minimum acceptable offers of responders (both as a proportion of income) decline by almost the same amount, suggesting a shared understanding that is characteristic of social norms. (4) Subjects experience more disadvantageous inequity from outgroup members relative to ingroup members.

中文翻译：

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身份与再分配：理论与证据

我们为越来越多的关于再分配和身份的文献做出了贡献。我们提出了一个理论模型，它嵌入了社会认同问题，如 Akerlof 和 Kranton（2000），以及不公平的厌恶偏好，如 Fehr 和 Schmidt（1999）。我们对英国政党的注册成员进行了人为的最后通牒游戏实验，他们的身份和再分配都很重要。实验结果如下。(1) 提议者和回应者表现出群体偏爱。(2) 相对于响应者，提议者在数量上表现出更强的社会认同效应。(3) 随着再分配税的增加，提议者的出价和响应者的最低可接受出价（均作为收入的比例）下降几乎相同的数量，表明具有社会规范特征的共同理解。