I examine the conditions under which trade can support peaceful coexistence and prosperity when particular social and ethnic groups are cheap targets of violence. A simple theoretical framework reveals that for a broad set of cases, while inter-group competition generates incentives for violence, the presence of non-replicable, non-expropriable inter-group complementarities becomes necessary to sustain peaceful coexistence over long time horizons. In addition to complementarity, two further conditions are important for deterring violence over time. When relatively mobile groups (e.g. immigrants) are vulnerable, a credible threat to leave can deter violence. When less mobile (indigenous) groups are vulnerable, high-monitoring costs that allow them to withhold production can improve their gains from trade. I describe the implications for indigenous entrepreneurship and cultural assimilation, the development of local institutions supporting inter-ethnic trust and immigration policies and policies aimed at mitigating conflict through financial innovations. I illustrate these implications using contemporary evidence and historical cases of organizations and institutions created to engender trade and support peace drawn from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.

中文翻译：

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和平交易*

我考察了当特定的社会和种族群体成为暴力的廉价目标时，贸易可在哪些条件下支持和平共处与繁荣。一个简单的理论框架表明，在广泛的情况下，尽管群体间的竞争产生了暴力诱因，但为了长期维持和平共处，必须存在不可复制，不可剥夺的群体间互补性。除了互补性，还有两个条件对于阻止一段时间内的暴力行为很重要。当相对流动的群体（例如移民）易受伤害时，可信的离开威胁可以阻止暴力。当流动性较低的（土著）群体易受伤害时，允许他们停止生产的高监控成本可以提高他们从贸易中获得的收益。我描述了对土著企业家精神和文化同化，支持民族间信任和移民政策的地方机构的发展以及旨在通过金融创新减轻冲突的政策的影响。我使用当代证据以及为促进贸易和支持来自非洲，亚洲，欧洲和拉丁美洲的和平而创建的组织和机构的历史案例来说明这些影响。