This article surveys the development of judicial control of administrative rule-making in the UK since the early 1970s and proposes a major reconceptualisation of the role of the courts in this area. Although the starting point for legal analysis of administrative rule-making remains the presumption that discretion must be retained, as encapsulated in the no-fettering rule, the article argues that judicial attitudes have changed substantially over the period under examination. The law has developed from a position which, without prohibiting administrative rule-making, deprived it of any significant legal status or effect, through an essentially permissive approach ushered in by British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology. This landmark case paved the way for increasing judicial regulation of administrative rules from the 1980s onwards, culminating in the situation today in which, mainly under the influence of the Human Rights Act, the adoption of rules or policies may sometimes be mandatory. Nevertheless, despite increasing judicial control over rule-making practices, the article argues that the law in this area remains far from satisfactory. On the one hand, while the no-fettering rule continues to frame and shape judicial intervention, it exists in considerable tension with newer legal doctrines and its scope and functions appear to have altered. On the other hand, judicial regulation of administrative rule-making is still patchy and incomplete, and its conceptual basis is often unclear. The article therefore contends that the time is ripe for a fundamental reconsideration of judicial control of administrative rule-making. It proposes that a clearer distinction should be drawn between the questions (1) whether administrative actors should seek to structure their discretion through rules and (2) how administrative rules should be regulated if they have been adopted. It argues for a relaxation of judicial control over the former question, advocating the abandonment of the no-fettering rule in favour of residual, rationality-based control over the degree of structuring which is appropriate in particular contexts. However, it recommends an extension and systematisation of judicial control over administrative rules, once a decision has been made to employ them, drawing upon an understanding of the functions of administrative rule-making to generate suitable regulatory standards.

中文翻译：

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行政裁量、行政规则制定和司法审查

本文调查了自 1970 年代初以来英国对行政规则制定的司法控制的发展，并建议对法院在该领域的作用进行重大的重新概念化。尽管对行政规则制定的法律分析的出发点仍然是自由裁量权必须保留的假设，正如无拘束规则所概括的那样，但本文认为，在审查期间，司法态度发生了重大变化。该法律是从不禁止行政规则制定、剥夺其任何重要法律地位或效力的立场发展而来的，这是通过 British Oxygen Co Ltd 诉技术部长案引入的一种基本上允许的方法。这一具有里程碑意义的案件为 80 年代以后加强对行政规则的司法规制铺平了道路，最终导致今天的情况，主要是在人权法的影响下，规则或政策的通过有时可能是强制性的。尽管如此，尽管司法对规则制定实践的控制越来越多，但文章认为这方面的法律仍然远不能令人满意。一方面，虽然无拘束规则继续构建和塑造司法干预，但它与新的法律学说存在相当大的紧张关系，其范围和功能似乎发生了变化。另一方面，对行政规则制定的司法规制尚不完善、不完善，其概念基础往往不明确。因此，本文认为，从根本上重新考虑对行政规则制定的司法控制的时机已经成熟。它建议对以下问题进行更明确的区分：(1) 行政行为者是否应寻求通过规则来构建其自由裁量权和 (2) 如果行政规则已被采用，应如何对其进行监管。它主张放宽对前一个问题的司法控制，主张放弃无拘束规则，支持在特定情况下对结构化程度进行剩余的、基于理性的控制。然而，一旦决定采用行政规则，它建议扩大和系统化对行政规则的司法控制，利用对行政规则制定功能的理解，以产生合适的监管标准。