The regulation of corporate behaviour has persisted in spite of peaks of neo-liberalism in many developed jurisdictions of the world, including the UK. This paradox is described as ‘regulatory capitalism’ by a number of scholars. Of particular note is the proliferation of corporate regulation to govern ‘socially responsible’ behaviour in recent legislative reforms in the EU and UK. In seeking to answer the broader question of whether corporate regulation indeed effectively governs and moderates corporate behaviour, this paper focuses on the nature of corporate regulation. Although different pieces of corporate regulation purport to achieve different objectives and impose different types of obligations, this paper offers an institutional account of corporate regulation, specifically in relation to the UK’s regulatory capitalism, which is in the mould of a liberal market economy. We argue that the nature and effectiveness of corporate regulation crucially depends on the nature of ‘regulatory capitalism’ in the type of economic order under discussion. Regulatory capitalism in the UK is characterised by three key tenets which reflect the spirit of the liberal market economy embraced here. Over time, gaps have been revealed in the achievements of these tenets of regulatory capitalism, particularly in relation to social expectations of the regulation of corporate behaviour. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007-9, we observe increasing legalisation in the EU and UK of CSR issues, framed in ‘new governance’ regulatory techniques. They hold promise for change in corporate conduct through deeper forms of corporate engagement and accountability but they appear at the same time relatively undemanding and susceptible to cosmetic compliance. By discussing key examples in new corporate regulation reforms in the EU and UK, we seek to understand why recent corporate regulation reforms seem to offer mixed and in some cases, relatively limited achievements in governing corporate behaviour. We argue that the institutional account of corporate regulation continues to be able to explain regulatory weaknesses and limited achievements, in spite of the deployment of ‘new governance’ regulatory techniques. This is because ‘new governance’ regulatory techniques are implemented within the ethos of regulatory capitalism which limits their potential to introduce paradigm shifts. However the limitations of these regulatory reforms highlight more sharply the institutional shifts that are needed in order to connect the efficacy of corporate regulation with meeting social expectations.

中文翻译：

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公司监管的制度理论

尽管包括英国在内的世界许多发达司法管辖区的新自由主义达到顶峰，但对公司行为的监管仍然存在。许多学者将这种悖论描述为“监管资本主义”。特别值得注意的是，在欧盟和英国最近的立法改革中，公司监管的激增以管理“对社会负责”的行为。为了回答公司监管是否确实有效地管理和调节公司行为这一更广泛的问题，本文重点关注公司监管的性质。尽管不同的公司监管旨在实现不同的目标并施加不同类型的义务，但本文提供了公司监管的制度性说明，特别是与英国的监管资本主义有关的，这是自由市场经济的模式。我们认为，公司监管的性质和有效性在很大程度上取决于所讨论的经济秩序类型中“监管资本主义”的性质。英国的监管资本主义具有三个关键原则，它们反映了这里所接受的自由市场经济的精神。随着时间的推移，这些监管资本主义原则的成就已经显现出来，尤其是在社会对企业行为监管的期望方面。在 2007-9 年全球金融危机之后，我们观察到欧盟和英国企业社会责任问题日益合法化，以“新治理”监管技术为框架。它们有望通过更深层次的企业参与和问责制改变企业行为，但同时它们似乎要求相对较低，并且容易受到表面上的合规性影响。通过讨论欧盟和英国新公司监管改革的主要例子，我们试图理解为什么最近的公司监管改革似乎在管理公司行为方面取得的成就参差不齐，在某些情况下还相对有限。我们认为，尽管部署了“新治理”监管技术，但公司监管的制度解释仍然能够解释监管弱点和有限的成就。这是因为“新治理”监管技术是在监管资本主义的精神内实施的，这限制了它们引入范式转变的潜力。