This paper investigates the impact of baseball’s reserve clause as it evolved from a “gentleman’s agreement” to a formal contract stipulation. Using data describing the salaries of 34 Major League Baseball players during the 1880s, we test whether average salaries, remuneration to marginal product, and the premium paid to a player for changing teams were materially impacted when the reserve clause became binding in 1887. The empirical results suggest that, controlling for player attributes and the overall macroeconomy, average real salaries in the sample fell by 6–9% after the binding reserve clause. We also find that the premium for moving to a new team was reduced by 70% after the binding reserve clause was implemented, supporting Rottenberg’s invariance principle.

中文翻译：

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在美国职棒大联盟中引入储备金条款：证据表明该条款对1880年代某些球员的薪资产生影响

本文研究了棒球后备条款从“绅士协议”演变成正式合同规定的影响。使用描述1880年代34名美国职业棒球大联盟球员薪水的数据，我们测试了1887年储备金条款具有约束力时，平均薪水，边际产品报酬以及为球员更换球队而向球员支付的保险费是否受到实质性影响。结果表明，在扣除准备金条款后，在控制参与者属性和整体宏观经济的情况下，样本中的平均实际工资下降了6–9％。我们还发现，实施具有约束力的准备金条款后，转入新团队的保费降低了70％，从而支持了罗滕伯格的不变性原则。