This paper proposes a theory of why the state enacted social policy that regulated the length of the working day in 19th century industrial England. This paper will argue that, far from being capable of self-regulation, the capitalist labor market during Britain’s industrial revolution is best conceptualized as consisting of two major social coordination problems resulting from conflicting interests between and within capital and labor. Left unregulated, this dual social coordination problem caused the overexploitation of labor, with dire consequences for both the capitalist and working classes. The reason why this coordination problem could not self-correct was because the wage-labor bargain contained the externality of unwaged household labor. The existence of this externality became deleterious to firms’ profitability and workers’ survival, especially given the high levels of female labor force participation. This social coordination problem justified and required state regulation into industrial relations. By conceptualizing protective policy as the solution to a dual social coordination problem caused by conflicting interests among heterogeneous firms and workers, this paper extends the Polanyian framework with an explicit theory of exploitation based on the classical theory of competition and a feminist emphasis on social reproduction and unwaged labor.

中文翻译：

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国家管制的政治经济学：以英国工厂法为例

本文提出了一个理论，说明为什么国家制定了社会政策来规范 19 世纪工业英国的工作日长度。本文将论证，英国工业革命期间的资本主义劳动力市场远不能自我调节，最好将其概念化为由资本与劳动力之间和内部利益冲突导致的两个主​​要社会协调问题组成。如果不加以管制，这种双重社会协调问题导致了劳动力的过度剥削，对资本家和工人阶级都造成了可怕的后果。这个协调问题之所以不能自我纠正，是因为雇佣劳动交易包含了无工资家庭劳动的外部性。这种外部性的存在对公司的盈利能力和工人的生存有害，特别是考虑到女性劳动力参与率很高。这种社会协调问题证明并需要国家对劳资关系进行监管。通过将保护政策概念化为解决由异质企业和工人之间的利益冲突引起的双重社会协调问题的解决方案，本文扩展了波兰尼的框架，并以基于古典竞争理论的明确剥削理论和女权主义强调社会再生产和无薪劳动。