Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid management's excessive risk taking and short-run oriented decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis.

中文翻译：

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劳工代表如何影响高管薪酬的激励取向？

与先前的文献相反，我们假设劳工的利益很可能像股东一样，旨在确保企业的长期生存。因此，监事会的员工代表很可能会增加基于激励的薪酬，以避免管理层过度冒险和短期决策。我们针对405家上市公司收集了2006年至2011年期间高管薪酬的独特面板数据，并使用Hausman-Taylor方法来估计共鸣对薪酬设计的影响。最后，代码终止对基于绩效的薪酬构成具有显着的积极影响，这支持了我们的假设。