ABSTRACT Abuse of superior bargaining power demonstrates a domain where practice precedes theory. Although the scanty regulation across the world has always been criticized for the lack of legal certainty as well as reasonable economic justification, legislative attempts never rested and extensively emerged in the last decade. The incomplete contract theory may offer one value perspective on the efficient loss of this abusive conduct. Opportunism applied by strong parties in long-term contracts involving relationship-specific investment may cause weak parties to underinvest, thus reducing social welfare. While contract law and antitrust law can mitigate some concerns pertaining to the related abuse, both of them are ultimately not perfect regulatory instruments. Consequently, a special regulation beyond contract law and antitrust law should be established for the purpose of assigning residual rights of control to the parties who have important decisions on the relationship-specific investment.

中文翻译：

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优越的议价能力：好的、坏的和丑陋的

摘要 优越议价能力的滥用表明了实践先于理论的领域。尽管世界各地的监管不力一直因缺乏法律确定性和合理的经济理由而受到批评，但立法尝试从未停止并在过去十年中广泛涌现。不完全契约理论可以为这种滥用行为的有效损失提供一种价值视角。强方在涉及特定关系投资的长期合同中采用的机会主义可能会导致弱方投资不足，从而降低社会福利。虽然合同法和反垄断法可以减轻与相关滥用有关的一些担忧，但它们最终都不是完美的监管工具。最后，