ABSTRACT In a private company, conflicts arise from disagreements between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders may be involved in the management and active monitoring of directors in order to maximize the value of the company. On the other hand, they may also use their power to benefit themselves at the expense of the company and other shareholders such as by appointing their family members or acquaintances to be on the board of directors regardless of their qualification and performance and granting them high remuneration. Controlling shareholders can also oppress non-controlling shareholders by removing the latter from management positions and refusing to distribute dividends even when the company has sufficient profits to do so. This leaves non-controlling shareholders with no financial benefits and eventually these shareholders involuntarily decide to leave the company. This article discusses how controlling shareholders dominate the company and examines how Thai laws, particularly the Civil and Commercial Code which governs private companies, prevent controlling shareholders from exploiting the benefits of the company and non-controlling shareholders and provide remedies for both the company and non-controlling shareholders. The author argues that the legal mechanisms for deterring controlling shareholders from wrongdoing and providing remedies are not effective enough.

中文翻译：

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监管泰国私营公司的控股股东

摘要 在一家私人公司中，冲突源于控股股东和非控股股东之间的分歧。控股股东可能会参与董事的管理和积极监督，以实现公司价值的最大化。另一方面，他们也可能利用自己的权力为自己谋取利益，牺牲公司和其他股东的利益，例如任命其家庭成员或熟人担任董事会成员，而不管他们的资格和业绩如何，并给予他们高额报酬。 . 控股股东也可以通过取消非控股股东的管理职位并拒绝分配股息来压迫非控股股东，即使公司有足够的利润这样做。这使得非控股股东没有经济利益，最终这些股东不由自主地决定离开公司。本文讨论了控股股东如何支配公司，并考察了泰国法律，特别是管理私营公司的民商法典，如何防止控股股东利用公司和非控股股东的利益，并为公司和非控股股东提供补救措施。 ——控股股东。笔者认为，遏制控股股东不当行为和提供救济的法律机制不够有效。尤其是《民商法》对私营公司的管理，防止控股股东利用公司和非控股股东的利益，为公司和非控股股东提供救济。笔者认为，遏制控股股东不当行为和提供救济的法律机制不够有效。尤其是《民商法》对私营公司的管理，防止控股股东利用公司和非控股股东的利益，为公司和非控股股东提供救济。笔者认为，遏制控股股东不当行为和提供救济的法律机制不够有效。