By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance.

中文翻译：

---

假设，以及它们与无知论据的关系

通过从无罪推定的角度解释无知的论证，论证理论的许多教科书表明，一些来自无知的论证可能与某些类型的推定推理具有共同的基本特征。道格拉斯·沃尔顿（Douglas Walton）偶尔会提出这种观点的更强版本，它表明无知和推定推理的论点几乎无法区分。本文探讨了更强提议的性质和局限性，并认为最初的假设和无知的论点没有密切联系。主要有以下三个原因。首先，与典型的推定推理不同，来自无知的论证是一种否定的推理。其次，典型的初始假设对更广泛的失败者敏感，因此假设了更高的（负面）可接受标准。第三，从辩证的角度看，最初的推定和无知的论证带来了不同的攻击权利和义务。我的结论是沃尔顿的直觉是不受支持的，或者充其量只限于来自无知的实际假设和实际论证。