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Liability Law under Scientific Uncertainty
American Law and Economics Review ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2017-07-28 , DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahx016
Luigi Alberto Franzoni

This article investigates the implications of uncertainty aversion on optimal liability law. Of special interest is the case in which the causal link between conduct and harm is not known with certainty, as is frequently the case with toxic torts. Under negligence, uncertainty aversion calls for a higher standard of care if, and only if, the safest prevention measures are also the most reliable ones (i.e., they reduce the uncertainty perceived by the victim). Strict liability dominates negligence when the injurer has lower degrees of uncertainty aversion than the victim and can formulate more precise estimates of the probability of harm. When harm is dispersed on a very large number of victims, however, negligence dominates independently of their degree of uncertainty aversion.

中文翻译:

科学不确定性下的责任法

本文研究不确定性规避对最优责任法的影响。特别令人关注的是,行为和伤害之间的因果关系并不确定,就像有毒侵权行为一样。在疏忽大意下,只有在最安全的预防措施也是最可靠的措施时(即,它们减少了受害者所感知的不确定性),不确定感规避才需要更高的护理标准。当伤害者比受害者具有较低程度的不确定性厌恶时,严格责任就占了疏忽大意,并且可以对伤害的可能性做出更精确的估计。但是,当伤害分散到大量受害者身上时,过失便成为主导,而与不确定性的厌恶程度无关。
更新日期:2017-07-28
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