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Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence
American Law and Economics Review ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2017-03-11 , DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahw023
A. Mitchell Polinsky

This article considers the social desirability of prison work programs in a model in which the function of imprisonment is to deter crime. Two types of prison work programs are studied—voluntary ones and mandatory ones. A voluntary work program is socially beneficial: if prisoners are paid a wage that just compensates them for their disutility from work, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence is unaffected, but society obtains the product of the work program. But a mandatory work program is superior to a voluntary work program: if prisoners are forced to work without compensation, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence rises, allowing society to restore deterrence and save resources by reducing the probability of detection or the sentence length, and also to obtain greater output than under the optimal voluntary work program. In an extension of the basic analysis, however, in which prisoners vary in their disutility from work, a voluntary work program may be superior to a mandatory work program because prisoners with relatively high disutility from work can elect not to work.

中文翻译:

威慑模式下的监狱工作计划

本文考虑了监狱工作方案在社会上的可取性,在这种模型中,监禁的功能是阻止犯罪。研究了两种类型的监狱工作方案,即自愿性方案和强制性方案。自愿工作计划对社会有益:如果给囚犯支付的工资只是补偿他们对工作的无用功,则监禁的威慑作用不会受到影响,但社会会获得工作计划的产物。但是强制性工作方案优于自愿性工作方案:如果囚犯被迫无偿工作,监禁的威慑作用就会增强,社会可以通过减少侦查的可能性或刑期的长短来恢复威慑力并节省资源,并获得比最佳自愿工作计划更大的产出。
更新日期:2017-03-11
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