There are good reasons to believe that consumers’ behavior is sometimes influenced by systematic misperceptions of legal norms that govern product quality. Consumers might misperceive specific rules, such as those found in food safety regulations, as well as more general standards, such as the unconscionability doctrine or limitations on waivers of default substantive or procedural rights. When demand is affected by systematic misperceptions of legal norms, lawmakers may be able to maximize welfare by deviating from the legal standard that would be optimal in the absence of misperception. We use a formal model to characterize these optimal deviations under different legal regimes (with different types and magnitudes of sanctions). In particular, should the legal standard be adjusted to counteract or confirm the misperception? For instance, if consumers underestimate the level of legal protection is it desirable to raise the legal standard to counteract the misperception? Or should lawmakers lower the legal standard to confirm the misperception?

中文翻译：

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消费者市场对法律的误解

有充分的理由相信，消费者的行为有时会受到系统性地错误支配产品质量的法律规范的影响。消费者可能会误解特定规则，例如食品安全法规中发现的规则，以及更通用的标准，例如不合情理的原则或对默认的实体或程序权利的放弃的限制。当需求受到对法律规范的系统性误解的影响时，立法者也许可以通过偏离在没有误解的情况下最佳的法律标准来最大化福利。我们使用正式模型来描述不同法律制度（制裁的类型和程度不同）下的这些最佳偏差。特别是，应该对法律标准进行调整以抵消或确认误解吗？例如，如果消费者低估了法律保护的水平，是否有必要提高法律标准以消除误解？还是立法者应该降低法律标准以确认误解？