Bargaining between consumer‐product manufacturers and their retail customers is at least nominally constrained by the prohibitions on price discrimination of the Robinson–Patman Act (RPA) of 1936. However, because the RPA is generally regarded as being inconsistent with the anti‐trust principle of protecting consumers, it is not often enforced by the Federal Trade Commission or the Anti‐trust Division of the Department of Justice. Because of the perceived ineffectiveness of the RPA, it is unclear whether manufacturers follow the letter of the law, or actively bargain with their downstream customers. In this paper, we use data on wholesale and retail prices for yogurt products, and a Nash‐in‐Nash vertical bargaining model, to test whether the RPA represents a real constraint on bargaining between manufacturers and retailers. We find that this is not the case, and that vertical markets for consumer goods are more accurately characterized as bargaining‐markets than markets regulated by the RPA. Further, we demonstrate that strict enforcement of the RPA would improve social welfare, but would not protect weak retailers.

中文翻译：

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罗宾逊-帕特曼法案和纵向关系

消费品制造商与其零售客户之间的讨价还价至少在名义上受到 1936 年罗宾逊-帕特曼法案 (RPA) 禁止价格歧视的限制。 然而，因为 RPA 通常被认为不符合反垄断原则在保护消费者方面，联邦贸易委员会或司法部反托拉斯司通常不强制执行。由于 RPA 被认为是无效的，目前尚不清楚制造商是遵守法律条文，还是积极与下游客户讨价还价。在本文中，我们使用酸奶产品的批发和零售价格数据以及 Nash-in-Nash 垂直讨价还价模型来测试 RPA 是否真正限制了制造商和零售商之间的讨价还价。我们发现情况并非如此，消费品的垂直市场比 RPA 监管的市场更准确地描述为讨价还价市场。此外，我们证明严格执行 RPA 会改善社会福利，但不会保护弱势零售商。