We conducted a two‐treatment randomized control trial in northern Ghana to investigate how bundling index insurance with agricultural loans affects smallholder access to credit. In one treatment, farmer groups were invited to apply for production loans bundled with an index insurance contract that, in the event of a drought, indemnifies farmers directly (micro‐insured loans). In the second treatment, farmer groups were invited to apply for production loans bundled with an index insurance contract that, in the event of a drought, indemnifies the lender on the condition that the indemnity be used to retire the farmer's debt obligation (meso‐insured loans). Farmer groups in the control category were invited to apply for uninsured loans. We find that insured loans increase farmers' likelihood of receiving credit by between 15 and 21 percentage points. Exploring the mechanisms of this effect, we find no impact on the likelihood that farmers apply for credit but do find an increase in the likelihood of loan approvals of between 17 and 25 percentage points.

中文翻译：

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保险贷款和信贷获取：来自加纳北部随机实地试验的证据

我们在加纳北部进行了一项双处理随机对照试验，以调查将指数保险与农业贷款捆绑在一起如何影响小农获得信贷的机会。在一种处理中，农民团体被邀请申请与指数保险合同捆绑在一起的生产贷款，在发生干旱时，直接向农民提供赔偿（小额保险贷款）。在第二种处理中，农民团体被邀请申请与指数保险合同捆绑的生产贷款，该合同在发生干旱时向贷款人提供赔偿，条件是赔偿金额用于偿还农民的债务（中观保险）。贷款）。控制类农民团体被邀请申请无保险贷款。我们发现保险贷款增加了农民的 获得信贷的可能性在 15 到 21 个百分点之间。探索这种效应的机制，我们发现对农民申请信贷的可能性没有影响，但确实发现贷款批准的可能性增加了 17 到 25 个百分点。