Some legal scholars—skeptics—question the conventional wisdom that corporations failed to provide adequate information to prospective investors before the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). These skeptics argue that the Securities Act’s disclosure requirements were largely unnecessary. For example, Paul G. Mahoney in his 2015 book, Wasting A Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails, relied on the fact that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) imposed disclosure requirements in the 1920s to conclude that stories about poor pre-Act disclosure are “demonstrably wrong”. (Likewise, Roberta Romano argued in Empowering Investors that “there is little tangible proof” that disclosure was inadequate pre-Securities Act.) This Article sets out to determine who is correct, those that accept the conventional wisdom that pre-Securities Act disclosure was inadequate, or the skeptics? The Author examined twenty-five stock prospectuses (the key piece of disclosure provided to prospective investors) that predate the Securities Act. This primary-source documentation strongly suggests that—contrary to the assertions of skeptics—pre-Act prospectuses did fail to provide potential investors with financial statements, as well as information about capitalization and voting rights, and executive compensation.

中文翻译：

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捍卫联邦强制性披露制度：遵守《证券前法》招股说明书

一些法律学者（持怀疑态度的人）质疑传统观念，即公司在1933年《证券法》（《证券法》）通过之前未能向潜在投资者提供足够的信息。这些怀疑论者认为，《证券法》的披露要求在很大程度上是不必要的。例如，保罗·马洪尼（Paul G. Mahoney）在其2015年的著作《浪费危机：证券监管为何失败》中，依靠纽约证券交易所（NYSE）在1920年代施加了披露要求这一事实来得出结论，即有关行为前不良披露的故事是“明显错误”。（同样，罗伯塔·罗曼诺（Roberta Romano）在《赋权投资者》中指出，“几乎没有切实证据表明披露是不符合《证券法》之前的要求的。”该条款旨在确定谁是正确的，那些接受《证券法》之前的披露不充分的传统观念的人，还是怀疑者？作者研究了《证券法》之前的25个股票招股说明书（提供给准投资者的关键信息）。这份原始资料强烈表明，与怀疑者的主张相反，《法前行动》招股说明书确实未能为潜在投资者提供财务报表，资本化和投票权以及高管薪酬的信息。