Puerto Rico, as a quasi-sovereign U.S. territory, is confronting a debt crisis of unparalleled legal complexity. This article analyzes the collective action problems in sovereign debt finance in the context of Puerto Rico’s quasi-sovereign debt dilemma. We examine how sovereign debtors engage with their private creditors in the absence of a formal bankruptcy regime and show how various legal incentives, imperatives, and constraints shape the degree and form of creditor engagement. Drawing on this conceptual framework, this article analyzes the role of these factors in the market-based debt restructuring by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) and hypothesizes how these factors may influence the statutory restructuring process underway under the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). Despite the idiosyncratic aspects of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis, the potential pathways for debtor-creditor cooperation in Puerto Rico provide valuable insights on the various ways that law influences debtor-creditor cooperation in sovereign debt finance beyond the enforcement of state-based public regulation and contract-based private legal commitments.

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波多黎各的债务困境和主权偿债的途径

作为美国的半主权领土，波多黎各正面临着前所未有的法律复杂性的债务危机。本文分析了波多黎各准主权债务困境中主权债务融资中的集体行动问题。我们研究了在没有正式破产制度的情况下主权债务人如何与私人债权人进行交往，并说明了各种法律诱因，命令和约束条件如何影响债权人交往的程度和形式。本文基于此概念框架，分析了这些因素在波多黎各电力局（PREPA）进行的基于市场的债务重组中的作用，并假设这些因素如何影响波多黎各监督，管理下正在进行的法定重组程序，以及《经济稳定法》（PROMESA）。