What explains pay inequality among coworkers? Theories of organizational influence on inequality emphasize the effects of formal hierarchy. But restructuring, firm flattening, and individualized pay setting have challenged the relevance of these structuralist theories. I propose a new organizational theory of differences in pay, focused on task structure and the horizontal division of labor across jobs. When organizations specialize jobs, they reduce the variety of tasks performed by some workers. In doing so they leave exclusive job turf to other coworkers, who capture the learning and discretion associated with performing a distinct task. The division of labor thus erodes pay premiums for some workers while advantaging others through job turf. I test this theory with linked employer–employee panel data from U.S. labor unions, which include a type of data that is rarely collected: annual reporting on work tasks. Results show that reducing task variety lowers workers’ earnings, while increasing job turf raises earnings. When organizations reduce task variety for some workers, they increase job turf for others. Without assuming fixed job hierarchies and pay rates, interdependencies in organizational task allocation yield unequal pay premiums among coworkers.

中文翻译：

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工作领域或多样性：作为组织不平等根源的任务结构

什么解释了同事之间的薪酬不平等？组织对不平等的影响理论强调正式等级制度的影响。但重组、公司扁平化和个性化薪酬设置对这些结构主义理论的相关性提出了挑战。我提出了一种新的薪酬差异组织理论，侧重于任务结构和跨工作的横向分工。当组织专业化工作时，它们会减少一些工人执行的任务的多样性。在这样做的过程中，他们将专属的工作地盘留给了其他同事，他们会获得与执行不同任务相关的学习和判断力。因此，劳动分工侵蚀了一些工人的薪酬，同时通过工作地盘使其他人受益。我用来自美国工会的关联雇主-雇员面板数据检验了这个理论，其中包括一种很少收集的数据：工作任务的年度报告。结果表明，减少任务多样性会降低工人的收入，而增加工作范围会提高收入。当组织减少某些员工的任务多样性时，他们会增加其他人的工作范围。如果不假设固定的工作等级和工资率，组织任务分配的相互依赖性会导致同事之间不平等的薪酬溢价。