This article proposes a novel Stackelberg game approach for activating demand response (DR) program in a residential area aiming at addressing the mismatch between the demand and renewable energy generation. In this study, two major players, namely the aggregator as a leader and the consumers as followers, are considered. The aggregator, which owns a wind farm and also receives power from the independent system operator (ISO), strives to obtain the maximum matching between the consumers’ demand and forecasted wind power by incentivizing consumers to adjust their load through offering a bonus to them. On the other hand, consumers change their load profiles for obtaining the highest amount of bonuses. Each consumer has two kinds of loads including critical loads, which must be maintained under any circumstances, and the flexible loads, e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, which can be regulated for DR purposes. In order to consider the uncertainty associated with the wind generation and the demands, a scenario-based stochastic programming model has been adopted in this work. Results show the effectiveness of the Stackelberg game model used for interaction between the aggregator and consumers, and the best response that can be served to both of them.

中文翻译：

---

基于Stackelberg博弈的基于奖金的需求响应对装备有HVAC系统的住宅最终用户

本文提出了一种新颖的Stackelberg游戏方法，用于在住宅区激活需求响应（DR）程序，旨在解决需求与可再生能源发电之间的不匹配问题。在本研究中，考虑了两个主要参与者，即聚集者作为领导者和消费者作为跟随者。聚合商不仅拥有风电场，而且还从独立系统运营商（ISO）获得电力，它通过激励消费者通过向他们提供奖励来调整他们的负荷，努力使消费者的需求与预测的风能达到最大的匹配。另一方面，消费者改变他们的负荷曲线以获得最大数量的奖金。每个用户都有两种负载，包括临界负载（在任何情况下都必须保持）和灵活负载（例如加热，通风和空调（HVAC）系统，可以针对灾难恢复目的对其进行调节。为了考虑与风力发电和需求相关的不确定性，在这项工作中采用了基于情景的随机规划模型。结果显示了用于聚合器和消费者之间交互的Stackelberg游戏模型的有效性，以及可以为它们两者提供的最佳响应。