Homomorphic signature is an extremely important public key authentication technique for network coding to defend against pollution attacks. As a public key cryptographic primitive, it also encounters the same problem of how to confirm the relationship between some public key $pk$ and the identity $ID$ of its owner. In the setting of distributed network coding, the intermediate and destination nodes need to use the public key of source node S to check the validity of vector-signature pairs. Therefore, the binding of S and its corresponding public key becomes crucial. The popular and traditional solution is based on certificates which are issued by a trusted certification authority (CA) center. However, the generation and management of certificates is extremely cumbersome. Hence, in recent work, Lin et al. proposed a new notion of identity-based homomorphic signature, which intends to avoid using certificates. But the key escrow problem is inevitable for identity-based primitives. In this article, we propose another new notion (for network coding): certificateless homomorphic signature (CLHS), which is a compromise for the above two techniques. In particular, we first describe the definition and security model of certificateless homomorphic signature. Then based on bilinear map and the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, give a concrete implementation and detailedly analyze its security. Finally, performance analysis illustrates that our construction is practical.

中文翻译：

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网络编码的无证书同态签名方案

同态签名是一种非常重要的公钥身份验证技术，用于网络编码以防御污染攻击。作为公钥加密原语，它也遇到相同的问题，即如何确认某些公钥之间的关系 $ pk $ 和身份 $ ID $ 其所有者。在分布式网络编码的设置中，中间节点和目的节点需要使用源节点S的公钥来检查矢量签名对的有效性。因此，S及其对应的公共密钥的绑定变得至关重要。流行的传统解决方案基于受信任的证书颁发机构（CA）中心颁发的证书。但是，证书的生成和管理非常麻烦。因此，在最近的工作中，林等。提出了一种新的基于身份的同态签名概念，旨在避免使用证书。但是对于基于身份的原语，关键的托管问题是不可避免的。在本文中，我们提出了另一个新的概念（用于网络编码）：无证书同态签名（CLHS），它是上述两种技术的折衷方案。特别地，我们首先描述无证书同态签名的定义和安全模型。然后基于双线性图和计算的Diffie-Hellman（CDH）假设，给出具体的实现并详细分析其安全性。最后，性能分析表明我们的构建是可行的。