当前位置: X-MOL 学术Comput. Ind. Eng. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
An incentive mechanism for partner selection from a collaborative network with private information
Computers & Industrial Engineering ( IF 6.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-18 , DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2020.107053
Cheng Wang , Runhua Wu , Lili Deng

Partner selection is critical to the success of a Virtual Enterprise. This paper studies the partner selection problem under the virtual organization breeding environment where candidates have private information about their cost to undertake the tasks. A systematic solution is provided to reveal the true value of the private information and then select the optimal partners. This solution mainly comprises two steps: (1) For each possible cost combination, a multi-objective integer nonlinear programming model and an algorithm are designed to obtain the optimal partners. Then, a social choice correspondence, which indicates the optimal partners for any cost combination, is formulated. (2) An incentive mechanism is constructed to implement the social choice correspondence and ensure that candidates will announce their values of cost truthfully. Furthermore, a numerical study is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the solution and to investigate the relationship between the construction of the collaborative network and the utility to partners. We find that the number of candidates in each period affects the utility of partners as well as the expected surplus of the leading company significantly.



中文翻译:

从具有私人信息的协作网络中选择合作伙伴的激励机制

选择合作伙伴对于虚拟企业的成功至关重要。本文研究了虚拟组织滋生环境下的合作伙伴选择问题,在该环境中,候选人对执行任务的成本具有私人信息。提供了系统的解决方案以揭示私人信息的真实价值,然后选择最佳合作伙伴。该解决方案主要包括两个步骤:(1)针对每种可能的成本组合,设计一种多目标整数非线性规划模型和一种算法来获得最优伙伴。然后,制定了一个社会选择对应关系,该对应关系指示了任何成本组合的最佳合作伙伴。(2)建立激励机制来实现社会选择对应,并确保候选人如实公布其成本价值。此外,提供了一个数值研究来说明解决方案的有效性,并研究协作网络的构建与对合作伙伴的效用之间的关系。我们发现,每个时期的候选人数量都会大大影响合作伙伴的效用以及领先公司的预期盈余。

更新日期:2021-02-03
down
wechat
bug