ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue against three leading accounts of self-deception and propose a heretofore overlooked route to self-deception. The central problem with extant accounts is that they are unable to balance two crucial desiderata: (a) to make the dynamics of self-deception (e.g., the formation of self-deceptive beliefs) psychologically plausible, and (b) to capture self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which the self-deceiver is responsible. I argue that the three leading views all fail on one or both counts. However, I claim that many or most cases of self-deception conform to a different model, which I call ‘self-deception as omission.’ In these cases, the process of self-deceptive belief formation and the intentional act for which the self-deceiver is responsible come apart, allowing us to meet both desiderata. Self-deceptive beliefs are often formed by unconscious mechanisms closely analogous to “System 1” processes of dual-systems psychology, or by other mechanisms of motivated reasoning. The nascently self-deceptive subject then acquiesces in the comforting belief and commits an epistemic failure by allowing it to persist. If this is done for motivationally biased reasons – for example, preferring that the belief in question be true – then the subject is self-deceived and is blameworthy for her epistemic omission.

摘要

在本文中，我反对三个关于自欺欺人的主要说法，并提出了一种迄今为止被忽视的自欺欺人的途径。现有说明的中心问题是，他们无法平衡两个至关重要的愿望：（a）使自欺欺人的动力（例如，形成自欺欺人的信念）在心理上看似合理；以及（b）捕捉自我欺骗是自欺欺人负责的故意现象。我认为，三种主要观点都不能基于一项或两项。但是，我声称许多或大多数自欺欺人的情况都符合不同的模型，我称之为“自欺欺人”。在这些情况下，自我欺骗信念的形成过程和自我欺骗者所负责的故意行为是分开的，这使我们能够同时满足两个愿望。自我欺骗的信念通常是由与双重系统心理学的“系统1”过程非常相似的无意识机制，或由其他动机推理机制形成的。初生的自欺欺人的主体然后默许令人安慰的信念，并通过使其持续而造成认知上的失败。如果这样做是出于动机偏见的原因（例如，更喜欢所相信的信念是正确的），则该受试者会自欺欺人，并且是她的认知缺失的罪魁祸首。