ABSTRACT

The role of representational cognitive processes (RCPs) in theories of cognition remains a source of disagreement in philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. These debates are stoked by arguments that purport to show that RCPs neither receive support from nor support computational theories of cognition, and that dynamicist Embodied, Embedded, Extended (3E) and radical enactivist views of cognition show that RCPs can either be taken out of our heads or dispensed with entirely. We argue that these criticisms fail. We review familiar arguments for thinking that cognitive processes are representational. Next, we consider the challenge that RCPs neither support nor are supported by computational views of cognition, as well as the challenge that neuro-computational RCPs are rendered superfluous by dynamicist views of cognition. We then consider the challenge that intracranial RCPs are rendered superfluous by 3E and radical enactivist views of cognition. We grant that representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for computation. However, we argue that independent reasons support the explanatory utility of neuro-computational RCPs in dynamicist and 3E accounts of cognition and that radical enactivism’s claim that all RCPs are extracranial is mistaken about at least one species of cognitive processing, that of subitizing.

摘要

代表性认知过程（RCP）在认知理论中的作用仍然是心智哲学和认知神经科学中分歧的根源。这些争论被争论所围绕，这些争论旨在表明RCP既不得到认知的支持也不支持认知的计算理论，而动态主义的嵌入式，嵌入式，扩展（3E）和激进的认知主义者的认知表明RCP可以从我们的认知中脱颖而出。头或完全免除。我们认为这些批评失败了。我们回顾了熟悉的观点，认为认知过程具有代表性。接下来，我们考虑了RCP既不支持也不被认知的计算视图所支持的挑战，以及神经计算RCP被动态主义的认知视图所取代的挑战。然后，我们考虑到3E和激进的激进主义认知观使颅内RCP变得多余的挑战。我们认为表示对于计算既不是必需的也不是足够的。然而，我们认为独立的原因支持了神经计算RCP在动态主义者和3E认知方面的解释效用，而激进主义认为所有RCP都是颅外的说法被误认为是认知加工的至少一种，即亚化。