ABSTRACT

This essay challenges some assumptions of prevalent theories of empathy. The empathizer, according to these theories, must have an emotion or a representation that matches the recipient’s emotion or representation. I argue that these conditions fail to account for important cases, namely surrogate and out-group empathy. In the course of this argument, I isolate some conceptual difficulties in extant models of cognitive empathy. In place of the matching theories, I propose an indexical model that (1) distinguishes virtual from real self-reference and (2) replaces self–other distinctions with an epistemic condition. According to this account, empathy occurs when we index an intention to another person about whom we have the relevant knowledge or understanding.

摘要

本文对普遍共情理论的一些假设提出质疑。根据这些理论，移情者必须具有与接收者的情绪或表示相匹配的情绪或表示。我认为，这些条件不能解决重要的情况，即替代和团体同情。在争论的过程中，我在现存的认知共情模型中隔离了一些概念上的困难。代替匹配理论，我提出了一个索引模型，该模型（1）将虚拟和真实的自我参照区分开，（2）用认知条件代替自我-其他差异。根据这个说法，当我们将意图索引给我们拥有相关知识或理解的另一个人时，就会发生同理心。