ABSTRACT

Champions of the methodological movement of experimental philosophy have challenged the long-standing practice of relying on intuitive verdicts on cases in philosophical inquiry. They argue that their findings show that the verdicts of experts in philosophy are affected by factors not normally thought to be relevant to the truth of those verdicts. This paper offers an emended version of the expertise reply and explains why the new findings of experimental philosophers do not undermine philosophical expertise and the probative force of verdicts from the method of cases..

中文翻译：

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重新审视专业知识以应对变化问题

摘要

实验哲学方法论运动的拥护者已经挑战了长期以来的实践，即在哲学探究中依靠对案例的直觉判断。他们辩称，他们的发现表明，哲学专家的裁决受到通常认为与这些裁决的真理无关的因素的影响。本文提供了专业知识答复的修订版，并解释了为什么实验哲学家的新发现不会损害哲学专业知识和案件方法的判决效力。