Perceived intent is a pivotal factor in moral judgement: intentional moral violations are considered more morally wrong than accidental ones. However, a body of recent research argues that intent is less important for moral judgements of impure acts – that it, those acts that are condemned because they elicit disgust. But the literature supporting this claim is limited in multiple ways. We conducted a new test of the hypothesis that condemnation of purity violations operates independently from intent. In Study 1, participants judged the wrongness of moral violations that were either intentional or unintentional and were either harmful (e.g., stealing) or impure (e.g., public defecation). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness ratings that did not vary across harmful and disgusting scenarios. In Study 2, a registered report, participants judged the wrongness of disgust-eliciting moral violations that were either mundane and dyadic (e.g., serving contaminated food) or abnormal and self-directed (e.g., consuming urine). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness judgements that did not vary across mundane and abnormal scenarios. Findings challenge the claim that moral judgements about purity violations rely upon unique psychological mechanisms that are insensitive to information about the wrongdoer's mental state.

感知的意图是道德判断中的关键因素：故意的道德违背比偶然的道德违背更为道德。但是，最近的研究表明，意图对不道德行为的道德判断次要的重要性不强，因为对不道德行为的谴责是因为它们引起了厌恶。但是支持该主张的文献受到多种方式的限制。我们对假说的谴责进行了新的检验，即对纯净违规行为的谴责与意图无关。在研究1中，参与者判断道德违法行为是有意的或无意的，并且有害（例如，偷窃）或不纯洁（例如，公共排便）是错误的。结果显示，意图对道德错误评级有很大影响，而在有害和令人恶心的情况下，这种影响没有变化。在研究2中，有一份注册报告，参与者判断了令人反感的道德违法行为的错误，这些道德违法行为是平凡的和二分式的（例如，供应受污染的食物）或异常且自发的（例如，消耗尿液）。结果显示，意图对道德错误判断有很大影响，在平凡和异常的情况下，意图没有变化。调查结果质疑声称对违反纯洁行为的道德判断依赖于独特的心理机制，这种机制对不法行为者的心理状态信息不敏感。