Abstract

Late in their paper on hypersets, Chemero and Turvey characterize affordances as “quicksilvery,” prone to rapid appearance and disappearance. We contrast this view with Gibson’s emphasis on the stability of affordances. We argue that this apparent discrepancy can be resolved by appeal to the distinction between affordances as indefinite abstract types and definite affordance tokens (instances of the type that share the resemblance relation). These issues will be discussed in the context of their consistency with ecological realism, where Platonic idealism is eschewed in favor of a more Aristotelian process theory. These ideas will be examined in the broader context of the domain ontology to ensure that Gibson's seminal affordance concept has its greatest theoretical utility. Finally, we develop a process theory of ontological descent by which indefinite affordance possibilities become more definite affordance potentialities and these eventuate in the most definite affordance actualizing actions.

摘要

Chemero和Turvey在其关于超定型的论文的后期，将赠品描述为“怪癖”，易于快速出现和消失。我们将这种观点与Gibson强调的负担能力的稳定性进行对比。我们认为，这种明显的差异可以通过诉诸于作为不确定的抽象类型的馈赠与确定的馈赠令牌（具有相似关系的类型的实例）之间的区别来解决。这些问题将在它们与生态现实主义的一致性的背景下进行讨论，在这种情况下，柏拉图理想主义被避开了，而倾向于一种更亚里士多德的过程理论。这些思想将在领域本体的更广泛的上下文中进行研究，以确保Gibson的精益求精概念具有最大的理论实用性。最后，