We study groundwater management under a regime shock affecting water availability, using a dynamic common-property resource game. The different players correspond to different groundwater uses (irrigation or urban water supply), enabling us to consider competition between economic sectors for the stock with limited availability. The players have different water demand functions and, under certain circumstances depending on the shock, different discount rates. The effects of asymmetries in both demand and discount rates are analyzed, comparing cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. A numerical analysis for the particular case of the Western La Mancha aquifer in Spain is conducted to analyze the degree of inefficiency of non-cooperative solutions with respect to cooperative solutions in terms of welfare. We show that a higher asymmetry in discount rates reduces the inefficiency of non-cooperative solutions. The opposite result is obtained when considering the asymmetry in demand.

我们使用动态的公共财产资源博弈研究了在影响水供应的政权冲击下的地下水管理。不同的参与者对应于不同的地下水用途（灌溉或城市供水），这使我们能够考虑经济部门之间对存量有限的存量的竞争。参与者具有不同的用水需求功能，在某些情况下（取决于冲击），折扣率也不同。分析了不对称性对需求率和贴现率的影响，比较了合作和非合作解决方案。对西班牙西拉曼恰含水层的特殊情况进行了数值分析，以分析非合作解决方案相对于合作解决方案在福利方面的低效程度。我们表明折现率的更高不对称性降低了非合作解决方案的效率低下。当考虑需求的不对称性时，可获得相反的结果。