Servicization is an emerging business paradigm that entails selling services along with physical goods. Money is paid for the utility value derived from using the product. To ensure the product runs well, the servicizing manufacturer bears the cost for operating it. We establish a Stackelberg game to investigate the interaction between a manufacturer and an operator using the product provided by the manufacturer. As a servicizing firm, the manufacturer is more likely to be capital-constrained. When the manufacturer has to raise funds for the production, it has two channels: external financing, which means raising funds from a bank, and internal financing, which means raising funds from the operator. Both the manufacturer and the operator may act as the leader under external financing, while under internal financing, the operator always moves first. We find that under external financing, moving first is not always beneficial. Also, high operating efficiency benefits both chain members when the manufacturer is the leader, but both are hurt when the operator leads. We find that it can be optimal to provide a subsidy not only when the operating efficiency is low but also when it is very high. Furthermore, when the per-unit price is high, the manufacturer should accept a high interest rate to facilitate earning more profit.

服务化是一种新兴的商业范式，涉及将服务与实物商品一起出售。支付使用该产品所产生的效用价值。为确保产品正常运行，维修服务的制造商承担操作费用。我们建立了一个Stackelberg游戏，以研究制造商与操作员之间使用制造商提供的产品进行交互的情况。作为服务公司，制造商更容易受到资金约束。当制造商必须为生产筹集资金时，它有两个渠道：外部筹资，这意味着从银行筹集资金；内部筹资，这意味着从运营商筹集资金。在外部融资的情况下，制造商和运营商都可以充当领导者，而在内部融资的情况下，运营商总是先行。我们发现，在外部融资下，先走并不总是有益的。同样，当制造商为领导者时，较高的运行效率会使两个链成员受益，而当操作者领导时，两者都会受到损害。我们发现，不仅在运营效率低下而且在非常高的情况下提供补贴也是最佳的。此外，当单价较高时，制造商应接受较高的利率以促进获得更多利润。