Abstract We study a class of preferences that generalize substitutable ones and allows complementarities in a college admissions model. We show that a stable matching exists under this class of preferences by using an algorithm which we call the Conditional Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Furthermore, we show that the algorithm is strategy-proof for the student side if we assume in addition a law of aggregate demand adapted to our setting.

中文翻译：

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一种用于有条件的词典可替代偏好的改进延迟接受算法

摘要 我们研究了一类偏好，这些偏好概括了可替代的偏好，并允许大学招生模型中的互补性。我们通过使用一种称为条件延迟接受算法的算法来证明在此类偏好下存在稳定匹配。此外，如果我们另外假设总需求定律适合我们的设置，我们表明该算法对学生来说是策略证明。