One of the most important and critical requirements for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is security under strict latency. Typically, authentication protocols for vehicular ad hoc networks need to authenticate themselves frequently. This results in reduced application traffic and increased overhead. Moreover, the mobile nature of vehicles makes them a prime target for physical, side channel, and cloning attacks. To address these issues, this article presents an efficient protocol for authentication in the IoV. The proposed protocol uses physical unclonable functions to provide the desired security characteristics. To reduce the overhead of authentication and improve the throughput of application layer packets, the proposed protocol uses a three-layered infrastructure architecture for IoVs, i.e., roadside units (RSUs), RSU gateways, and trusted authority. A vehicle needs to authenticate only once when it enters the area of an RSU gateway which may engulf multiple RSUs. A performance analysis of the protocol shows that the proposed strategy significantly reduces the number of authentication packets and MAC/PHY overhead while the security analysis demonstrates its robustness against various types of attacks.

中文翻译：

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一种隐私保护且可扩展的车联网身份验证协议


车联网 (IoV) 最重要、最关键的要求之一是严格延迟下的安全性。通常，车载自组织网络的身份验证协议需要经常对自身进行身份验证。这会导致应用程序流量减少并增加开销。此外，车辆的移动特性使其成为物理攻击、侧信道攻击和克隆攻击的主要目标。为了解决这些问题，本文提出了一种有效的车联网身份验证协议。所提出的协议使用物理不可克隆功能来提供所需的安全特性。为了减少身份验证的开销并提高应用层数据包的吞吐量，该协议使用了车联网的三层基础架构，即路边单元（RSU）、RSU 网关和可信机构。车辆在进入 RSU 网关区域时只需进行一次认证，该区域可能会吞没多个 RSU。协议的性能分析表明，所提出的策略显着减少了身份验证数据包的数量和 MAC/PHY 开销，而安全分析表明其对各种类型攻击的鲁棒性。