Hospitals purchase medical supplies from the dealer on consignment contracts. Dealer provides a return policy for unused inventory but charging a return fee. Two hospitals could share inventory which reduces the amount of return to the dealer. Motivated by this consignment contract policy for the medical supply chain, we develop a common dealer and two independent retailers framework that considers retailers' sharing action and return problem. We aim at developing a coordinating mechanism to manage the retailers' sharing and return action that benefits both the dealer and retailers. Dealer-dominated sharing and retailer-dominated sharing are compared from the perspective of sharing performance and expected profits. We also analyse the condition that the dealer is better off from retailers' sharing when the dealer has the power to encourage retailers' sharing, and the dealer's trading preference for a non-cooperative retailer or cooperative retailers when the dealer has no power to encourage retailers' sharing. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine the sensitivity of retailers' sharing decisions, retailers' and dealer's profit to the return price.

医院根据寄售合同从经销商那里购买医疗用品。经销商为未使用的库存提供退货政策，但收取退货费。两家医院可以共享库存，从而减少了退还给经销商的数量。受医疗供应链委托合同政策的激励，我们开发了一个共同的经销商和两个独立的零售商框架，以考虑零售商的共享行动和退货问题。我们旨在开发一种协调机制来管理零售商的共享和退货行为，这对经销商和零售商均有利。从共享绩效和预期利润的角度比较了以经销商为主的共享和以零售商为主的共享。我们还分析了经销商比零售商的状况更好的情况。当经销商有权力鼓励零售商共享时共享库存，以及当经销商无权鼓励零售商共享时经销商对非合作零售商或合作零售商的贸易偏好。进行了数值实验，以检验零售商的共享决策，零售商和经销商的利润对退货价格的敏感性。