This paper examines how the involvement of family members in family firms affects the roles of supervisory boards in two-tier board systems. Taking an agency and resource-based perspective, we argue that the occurrence of monitoring and advisory tasks of the board depends on the entanglement of family management and family ownership. This entanglement creates special governance requirements for family firms in two-tier board systems. We use a unique dataset of 186 German family firm observations to show that family involvement in management as well as a high family ownership reduces the occurrence of the monitoring tasks that the supervisory board performs. Moreover, we show that a growing number of owning family branches increases the monitoring tasks. We also provide evidence that family involvement increases the occurrence of the advisory tasks in relation to the monitoring ones.

本文探讨了家族成员对家族企业的参与如何影响两层董事会体系中监事会的角色。从代理和资源基础的角度来看，我们认为董事会监督和咨询任务的发生取决于家族管理和家族所有权的纠缠。这种纠缠对两层董事会体系中的家族企业提出了特殊的治理要求。我们使用包含 186 家德国家族企业观察结果的独特数据集来表明，家族参与管理以及较高的家族所有权会减少监事会执行的监督任务的发生。此外，我们发现，越来越多的家族分支增加了监控任务。我们还提供证据表明，家庭参与增加了与监测任务相关的咨询任务的发生。