Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that corporate governance should be weak in the absence of powerful residual claimants. We compare foundation owned firms (FoFs) and family firms, with and without codetermination. As foundations have no owners, residual claimants of FoFs are weak. This might strengthen FoF-managers and employees. Codetermination law also strengthens employees. We derive hypotheses about business policy of FoFs and test them. Our findings show that German FoFs are more labor intensive relative to family firms. But their wages and their hiring and firing policy are about the same. Their financing policy is more conservative, their financial performance is slightly weaker. Apart from financing policy, codetermination has similar effects. These findings indicate a stronger impact on corporate governance of employees in firms with weak residual claimants and in codetermined firms, combined with long-term orientation. But, in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), we do not find evidence of weak corporate governance.

中文翻译：

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基金会公司的员工导向和财务绩效

Shleifer和Vishny（1997）认为，在缺乏强有力的剩余索偿人的情况下，公司治理应较弱。我们比较了有或没有共同决定权的基金会所有的公司（FoF）和家族公司。由于基金会没有所有者，因此基金会的剩余索偿者比较薄弱。这可能会加强FoF经理和员工。共同终止法也增强了员工的能力。我们推导出有关FoF的业务策略的假设并进行测试。我们的发现表明，与家族企业相比，德国的FoFs劳动密集型。但是他们的工资，雇用和解雇政策差不多。他们的融资政策较为保守，财务业绩略弱。除融资政策外，共谋终止具有类似的效果。这些发现表明，残差索偿人少的公司和受代码确定的公司对员工的公司治理产生了更大的影响，并结合了长期发展方向。但是，与Shleifer和Vishny（1997）相比，我们没有发现公司治理薄弱的证据。