The costs of searching for a job vacancy are typically associated with fric- tion that deters or delays employment of potentially productive individuals. We demonstrate that in a labor market with moral hazard where effort is non- contractible, job search costs play a positive role, whose effect may outweigh the negative implications. As workers are provided incentives to exert effort by the threat of losing their job and having to search for a new vacancy, a reduction in job search costs leads to fewer employees willing to exert effort. The overall lower productivity will make more individuals and firms opting to stay out of the labor market, resulting in lower employment and decreased welfare. Eventually, a reduction of jobs search costs below a certain level results in collapse of the labor market.

中文翻译：

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求职成本和激励措施

寻找职位空缺的成本通常与阻碍或延迟潜在生产性个体就业的摩擦有关。我们证明，在有道德风险的劳动力市场中，工作是不可收缩的，求职成本起着积极的作用，其作用可能大于负面影响。由于会因失去工作和必须寻找新的空缺的威胁而激励工人努力工作，因此求职成本的降低导致愿意工作的员工人数减少了。总体而言，较低的生产率将使更多的个人和公司选择退出劳动力市场，从而导致就业率下降和福利下降。最终，将求职成本降低到一定水平以下会导致劳动力市场崩溃。