Non-Humean accounts of the metaphysics of nature posit either laws or powers in order to account for natural necessity and world-order. We argue that such monistic views face fundamental problems. On the one hand, neo-Aristotelians cannot give unproblematic power-based accounts of the functional laws among quantities offered by physical theories, as well as of the place of conservation laws and symmetries in a lawless ontology; in order to capture these characteristics, commitment to governing laws is indispensable. On the other hand, ontologies that entirely exclude some kind of power ascription to worldly entities (such as primitivism) face what we call the Governing Problem : such ontologies do not have the resources to give an adequate account of how laws play their governing role. We propose a novel dualist model, which, we argue, has the resources to solve the difficulties encountered by its two dominant competitors, without inheriting the problems of either view. According to the dualist model, both laws and powers (suitably conceived) are equally fundamental and irreducible to each other, and both are needed in order to give a satisfactory account of the nomological structure of the world. The dualist model constitutes thus a promising alternative to current monistic views in the metaphysics of science.

中文翻译：

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没有法律和（薄）权力，没有（管辖）法律

非休姆人对自然的形而上学的解释是定律或权力，以解释自然的必要性和世界秩序。我们认为这种一元论观点面临根本问题。一方面，新亚里士多德主义者不能在物理理论提供的数量之间，以及在无法的本体论中守恒律和对称性的位置上，对功能定律进行无问题的基于权力的解释。为了抓住这些特征，对执政法规的承诺是必不可少的。另一方面，完全排除了对世俗实体某种权力归属的本体（例如原始主义）面临着所谓的 治理问题 ：此类本体没有足够的资源来充分说明法律如何发挥其支配作用。我们提出了一种新颖的二元模型，我们认为，该模型具有解决两个主要竞争者所遇到的困难的资源，而不会继承任何一种观点的问题。根据二元模型，定律和权力（适当地构想）都是同等的基础，并且是不可约的，为了对世界的经济学结构有一个令人满意的解释，两者都是必需的。因此，二元论模型构成了科学形而上学中当前一元论观点的有前途的替代方案。