This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism (TSR), that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with the Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns specifically for perspectival forms of scientific realism.

中文翻译：

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现实主义，参考与观点

本文延续了对科学现实主义的一种说法，即“重言式科学现实主义”（TSR）的辩护，该主张基于这样的主张，即，除了某些完全有理由怀疑的基本物理学领域以外，不能连贯地想象当代科学的许多领域都是除了通过假定根本性的怀疑情景而假，这与科学哲学中的现实主义辩论无关。在本文中，我们专门讨论与库恩传统有关的意义变化和参照失败的威胁，这取决于对意义的描述论方法，并且我们认为描述论不是对意义和理论术语的参照的正确解释。我们建议，按照因果历史参照理论进行描述，可以更真实地描述不可观察的理论实体和性质的术语是如何参照的；我们认为这张图片对TSR特别有效。在上一节中，我们讨论了我们的论述如何引起对科学现实主义的透视形式的关注。