The purpose of this article is to develop an epistemology of scientific models in scientific research practices, and to show that disciplinary perspectives have crucial role in such an epistemology. A transcendental (Kantian) approach is taken, aimed at explanations of the kinds of questions relevant to the intended epistemology, such as “How is it possible that models provide knowledge about aspects of reality?” The approach is also pragmatic in the sense that the questions and explanations must be adequate and relevant to concrete scientific practice. First it is explained why the idea of models as representations in terms of similarity or isomorphism between a model and its target is too limited as a basis for this epistemology. An important finding is that the target-phenomenon is usually not something that can be observed in a straightforward manner, but requires both characterization in terms of measurable variables and subsumption under (scientific) concepts. The loss of this basis leads to a number of issues, such as: how can models be interpreted as representations if models also include conceptually meaningful linguistic content; how can researchers identify non-observable real-world target-phenomena that are then represented in the model; how do models enable inferential reasoning in performing epistemic tasks by researchers; and, how to justify scientific models. My proposal is to deal with these issues by analyzing how models are constructed, rather than by looking at ready-made models. Based on this analysis, I claim that the identification of phenomena and the construction of scientific models is guided and also confined by the disciplinary perspective within which researchers in a scientific discipline have learned to work. I propose a Kuhnian framework by which the disciplinary perspective can be systematically articulated. Finally, I argue that harmful forms of subjectivism, due to the loss of the belief that models objectively represent aspects of reality, can be overcome by making the disciplinary perspective(s) in a research project explicit, thereby enabling its critical assessment, for which the proposed Kuhnian framework provides a tool.

中文翻译：

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学科观点在科学模型认识论中的作用

本文的目的是在科学研究实践中发展科学模型的认识论，并表明学科观点在这种认识论中具有至关重要的作用。采取了先验（康德）方法，旨在解释与预期的认识论有关的问题，例如“模型如何提供有关现实方面的知识？” 从问题和解释必须充分且与具体科学实践相关的意义上说，该方法也是实用的。首先，解释了为什么以模型与目标之间的相似性或同构性来表示模型的思想作为这种认识论的基础太有限了。一个重要发现是，目标现象通常不是可以直接观察到的东西，而是需要根据可测量变量进行表征以及（科学）概念下的归纳。失去这种基础会导致许多问题，例如：如果模型还包含概念上有意义的语言内容，那么如何将模型解释为表示形式；研究人员如何识别模型中代表的不可观察的现实世界目标现象；模型如何在研究人员执行认知任务时实现推理推理；以及如何证明科学模型的合理性。我的建议是通过分析模型的构造方式而不是通过查看现成的模型来解决这些问题。根据此分析，我声称，现象的识别和科学模型的构建是受学科学科指导和限制的，学科学科的研究人员在学科学科中学会了工作。我提出了一个库恩主义的框架，通过它可以系统地阐明学科的观点。最后，我认为，可以通过明确研究项目中的学科观点，从而对其进行批判性评估，来克服由于主观主义丧失客观模型代表现实的信念而导致的有害形式。建议的Kuhnian框架提供了一种工具。我提出了一个库恩主义的框架，通过它可以系统地阐明学科的观点。最后，我认为，可以通过明确研究项目中的学科观点，从而对其进行批判性评估，来克服由于主观主义丧失客观模型代表现实的信念而导致的有害形式。建议的Kuhnian框架提供了一种工具。我提出了一个库恩主义的框架，通过它可以系统地阐明学科的观点。最后，我认为，可以通过明确研究项目中的学科观点，从而对其进行批判性评估，来克服由于主观主义丧失客观模型代表现实的信念而导致的有害形式。建议的Kuhnian框架提供了一种工具。