In this paper, I argue that Imre Lakatos’s account on the relation between the history and the philosophy of science, if properly understood and also if properly modified, can be valuable for the philosophical comprehension of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. The paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part, I provide a charitable exegesis of the Lakatosian conception of the history of science in order to show that Lakatos’s history cannot be a caricature. In the second part, I describe what I believe are the real problems of Lakatos’s account on a metaphysical and on a methodological level. In order to address these problems, I take advantage of the recent critique of the so-called “confrontation model”. Finally, in the third part, I suggest that a proper modification of Lakatos’s perspective can resolve the aforementioned problems without distorting Lakatos’s central aspiration, which is that the philosophical theories of scientific rationality can be assessed with the help of the history of science without losing their normative content.

中文翻译：

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重构理性的重构：以拉卡托斯的观点为基础，论述历史与科学哲学之间的关系

在本文中，我认为，如果对艾默尔·拉卡托斯（Imre Lakatos）的历史与科学哲学之间的关系进行恰当的理解和适当的修改，那么对哲学理解历史与科学哲学之间的关系可能具有宝贵的意义。本文分为三个主要部分。在第一部分中，我对拉卡托斯的科学历史概念进行了慈善解释，以表明拉卡托斯的历史不可能是漫画。在第二部分中，我从形而上和方法论层面描述了我认为是拉卡托斯的叙述的真正问题。为了解决这些问题，我利用了最近对所谓“对抗模型”的批评。最后，在第三部分中