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Perspectival objectivity
European Journal for Philosophy of Science ( IF 1.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-03-21 , DOI: 10.1007/s13194-020-00286-w
Peter W. Evans

Brukner (2018) proposes a no-go theorem for observer-independent facts. A possible consequence of the theorem is that there can be no absolute facts about the world, only facts relative to an observer. However, admitting such observer dependency runs the risk of licensing pernicious anthropocentrism in our account of reality, thereby precluding the possibility of objectivity in scientific inquiry, which would surely count as a mark against taking Brukner's result too seriously at face value. In this paper I argue that, properly understood, observer-dependent reality does not preclude objectivity, and I claim that this idea has philosophical pedigree, too. Working through the examples of colour perception and causality, I identify a perfectly reasonable notion of 'perspectival objectivity'. I argue that such a view would not be out of place in Bohr's philosophy of quantum theory, and claim that this notion of perspectival objectivity can be appropriated as part of an understanding of quantum phenomena to take the sting out of the possibility of observer-dependent reality, and permitting the objectivity required for scientific inquiry.

中文翻译:

透视客观性

Brukner(2018)为观察者无关的事实提出了一个不定理。该定理的可能结果是,关于世界没有绝对的事实,只有相对于观察者的事实。但是,在我们对现实的理解中,承认这种对观察者的依赖性冒着许可许可有害的人类中心主义的风险,从而排除了科学探究中客观性的可能性,这肯定会被视为反对将布鲁克纳的研究结果从表面上过于重视的标志。在本文中,我认为,正确理解的,与观察者相关的现实并不排除客观性,并且我认为这种想法也具有哲学谱系。通过颜色感知和因果关系的示例,我确定了“透视客观性”的完全合理的概念。
更新日期:2020-03-21
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