Data portability allows users to transfer data between competing online services. As data gets increasingly valuable for online services and users alike, the enforcement of data portability within the European Union by the General Data Protection Regulation will have important ramifications for the competition in online markets. Thus, this paper develops a game-theoretic model to examine firms’ strategic reaction to data portability and to identify the ensuing market outcomes. It can be shown, among others, that although data portability is designed to protect users, they may be hurt because market entrants have an incentive to increase the amount of collected data compared to a regime without data portability. However, profits for new services and total surplus increase if the costs for implementation are not too large. This likely improves innovation and service variety. Consequently, the results provide important insights and case-specific recommendations for managers and policy makers in data-driven online markets.

中文翻译：

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Internet 上的数据可移植性

数据可移植性允许用户在相互竞争的在线服务之间传输数据。随着数据对在线服务和用户等越来越有价值，欧盟内通过《通用数据保护条例》强制执行数据可移植性将对在线市场的竞争产生重要影响。因此，本文开发了一个博弈论模型来检查公司对数据可移植性的战略反应并确定随后的市场结果。可以证明，尽管数据可移植性旨在保护用户，但他们可能会受到伤害，因为与没有数据可移植性的制度相比，市场进入者有增加收集数据量的动机。但是，如果实施成本不是太大，新服务的利润和总盈余会增加。这可能会改善创新和服务多样性。因此，结果为数据驱动的在线市场中的管理者和政策制定者提供了重要的见解和针对特定案例的建议。