This study investigates the effect of voluntary disclosures on lending decisions in the repeated game. Using a unique dataset from a peer-to-peer lending platform, “ppdai” (paipaidai), we document that voluntary disclosures in the repeated game play a stronger role in promoting funding success than those in the one-shot game. We argue that voluntary disclosures improve the bidding activity in the repeated game through which they increase funding success. In addition, the greater impact of voluntary disclosures on funding success in the repeated game only holds for loans without a personal guarantee attribution. Our extended results suggest that the subjective voluntary disclosures in the repeated game have greater information content only when borrowers have a successful borrowing experience. We also point out that voluntary disclosures in the repeated game are associated with a lower probability of default. Our results are robust to the Heckman two-step estimation that addresses the self-selection effect and a specification designed to rule out the alternative explanation from reputation in the repeated game. Our study provides new insights into the real effects of costless, voluntary and unverifiable disclosures on lending decisions.

本研究调查了重复博弈中自愿披露对贷款决策的影响。使用点对点借贷平台“ppdai”（paipaidai）的独特数据集，我们记录了重复博弈中的自愿披露比一次性博弈中的自愿披露在促进融资成功方面发挥了更强的作用。我们认为，自愿披露可以改善重复博弈中的投标活动，从而提高融资成功率。此外，在重复博弈中，自愿披露对融资成功的更大影响仅适用于没有个人担保归属的贷款。我们的扩展结果表明，只有当借款人有成功的借款经历时，重复博弈中的主观自愿披露才具有更大的信息内容。我们还指出，重复博弈中的自愿披露与较低的违约概率相关。我们的结果对于解决自选择效应的赫克曼两步估计和旨在排除重复游戏中声誉的替代解释的规范是稳健的。我们的研究为无成本、自愿和不可验证的信息披露对贷款决策的实际影响提供了新的见解。