This paper focuses on (an interpretation of) the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X , then X -ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics.

中文翻译：

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从应该到目标：Enkrasia 的逻辑

本文重点关注（解释）Enkratic 理性原则，根据该原则，理性要求如果一个代理人真诚地并坚信她应该 X ，那么 X -ing 是她计划中的一个目标。我们分析了 Enkrasia 的逻辑结构及其对道义逻辑的影响。为此，我们详细说明了基本应该和派生应该之间的区别，并提供了具有三个特征算子的多模态邻域逻辑：基本应该的非正态算子、计划中的目标的非正态算子和正态派生应该的运算符。我们为结果逻辑证明了两个完备性定理，并通过产品更新提供了逻辑的动态扩展。我们通过考虑与过滤不一致的应该相关的问题来说明此设置如何通知道义逻辑，