The Repugnant Conclusion and its paradoxes pose a significant problem for outcome evaluation. Derek Parfit has suggested that we may be able to resolve this problem by accepting a view he calls ‘Perfectionism’, which gives lexically superior value to ‘the best things in life’. In this paper, I explore perfectionism and its potential to solve this problem. I argue that perfectionism provides neither a sufficient means of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion nor a full explanation of its repugnance. This is because even lives that are ‘barely worth living’ may contain the best things in life if they also contain sufficient ‘bad things’, such as suffering or frustration. Therefore, perfectionism can only fully explain or avoid the Repugnant Conclusion if combined with other claims, such as that bad things have an asymmetrical value relative to many good things. This combined view faces the objection that any such asymmetry implies Parfit’s ‘Ridiculous Conclusion’. However, I argue that perfectionism itself faces very similar objections, and that these are question-begging against both views. Finally, I show how the combined view that I propose not only explains and avoids the Repugnant Conclusion but also allows us to escape many of its paradoxes as well.

中文翻译：

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完美主义和令人反感的结论

令人反感的结论及其悖论给结果评估带来了重大问题。德里克·帕菲特 (Derek Parfit) 建议我们可以通过接受他称之为“完美主义”的观点来解决这个问题，这种观点赋予“生活中最美好的事物”在词汇上的优越价值。在本文中，我探讨了完美主义及其解决这个问题的潜力。我认为完美主义既没有提供足够的手段来避免令人反感的结论，也没有提供对其令人反感的完整解释。这是因为即使“几乎不值得过”的生活也可能包含生活中最好的东西，如果它们也包含足够的“坏东西”，例如痛苦或沮丧。因此，完美主义只有结合其他主张才能充分解释或避免令人反感的结论，例如，坏东西相对于许多好东西具有不对称的价值。这种综合观点面临反对意见，即任何此类不对称都意味着帕菲特的“荒谬结论”。然而，我认为完美主义本身面临着非常相似的反对意见，而且这些反对意见都是对这两种观点的质疑。最后，我展示了我提出的组合观点如何不仅解释和避免了令人反感的结论，而且还让我们摆脱了它的许多悖论。