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The Question of Violence Between the Transcendental and the Empirical Field: The Case of Husserl’s Philosophy
Human Studies ( IF 0.8 ) Pub Date : 2019-11-12 , DOI: 10.1007/s10746-019-09527-1
Remus Breazu

In this article, I address the question of violence with respect to the phenomenological difference between the transcendental and the empirical field. In the first part, I phenomenologically address the notion of violence, developing a concept required for an account of the phenomenon of violence. Thus, I correlate it with the notion of vulnerability, arguing that violence cannot be understood irrespective of vulnerability. However, a proper phenomenological account has to indicate the subjective conditions of possibility of a phenomenon as it is given in experience. Therefore, we should ask: what is the status of violence when we are talking about the transcendental field? This question leads to the second part of my article, where I address the notion of violence from the perspective of the difference between the pure and the empirical ego, as it has been traced out by Husserl. If from the point of view of an empirical ego the concept of violence is meaningful, from the point of view of the transcendental ego it seems to be absurd. This is particularly significant, because Husserl is talking about the transcendental ego as being immortal. The pure ego is thus invulnerable and this means that violence—understood from the point of view of both the violating subject and the violated one—is something that cannot be linked to the transcendental field. The question that arises—how is violence possible on the empirical level, since it is impossible on the transcendental level?—is a question to which Husserl cannot respond.

中文翻译:

先验场与经验场之间的暴力问题:以胡塞尔哲学为例

在本文中,我针对先验领域和经验领域之间的现象学差异来解决暴力问题。在第一部分中,我从现象学上讨论了暴力的概念,发展了一个解释暴力现象所需的概念。因此,我将其与脆弱性的概念相关联,认为无论脆弱性如何,都无法理解暴力。然而,适当的现象学解释必须表明在经验中给出的现象可能性的主观条件。因此,我们应该问:当我们谈论超验场时,暴力的地位是什么?这个问题引出了我文章的第二部分,在那里我从纯粹自我和经验自我之间的差异的角度讨论了暴力的概念,正如胡塞尔所指出的那样。如果从经验自我的角度来看,暴力的概念是有意义的,那么从超验自我的角度来看,它似乎是荒谬的。这一点特别重要,因为胡塞尔说先验自我是不朽的。纯粹的自我因此是无懈可击的,这意味着暴力——从侵犯主体和被侵犯主体的角度来理解——是无法与超验领域联系起来的东西。出现的问题——暴力如何在经验层面上可能,因为它在先验层面上是不可能的?——是胡塞尔无法回答的问题。从超越自我的角度来看,这似乎是荒谬的。这一点特别重要,因为胡塞尔说先验自我是不朽的。纯粹的自我因此是无懈可击的,这意味着暴力——从侵犯主体和被侵犯主体的角度来理解——是无法与超验领域联系起来的东西。出现的问题——暴力如何在经验层面上可能,因为它在先验层面上是不可能的?——是胡塞尔无法回答的问题。从超越自我的角度来看,这似乎是荒谬的。这一点特别重要,因为胡塞尔说先验自我是不朽的。纯粹的自我因此是无懈可击的,这意味着暴力——从侵犯主体和被侵犯主体的角度来理解——是无法与超验领域联系起来的东西。出现的问题——暴力如何在经验层面上可能,因为它在先验层面上是不可能的?——是胡塞尔无法回答的问题。纯粹的自我因此是无懈可击的,这意味着暴力——从侵犯主体和被侵犯主体的角度来理解——是无法与超验领域联系起来的东西。出现的问题——暴力如何在经验层面上可能,因为它在先验层面上是不可能的?——是胡塞尔无法回答的问题。纯粹的自我因此是无懈可击的,这意味着暴力——从侵犯主体和被侵犯主体的角度来理解——是无法与超验领域联系起来的东西。出现的问题——暴力如何在经验层面上可能,因为它在先验层面上是不可能的?——是胡塞尔无法回答的问题。
更新日期:2019-11-12
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