The following essay compares and contrasts Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time with an earlier lecture course that he delivered in the Winter Semester of 1919/2020 entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Heidegger says explicitly that the pre-phenomenal basis for his analysis in Being and Time is “entities” in their equipmental totality. He calls these the “preliminary theme” for his analysis of Dasein. While the analytic of Dasein is the first step in posing the question of Being, the pre-phenomenal basis for the analytic of Dasein is, he says, “entitities” or “equipment”. I argue that this can lead to certain misunderstandings, especially when he talks about nature and human relationships. In Basic Problems, Heidegger’s focus is not on “entities” or “equipment” but rather on experiences. In this earlier work, he is trying to develop a language that can capture the intensity of lived-experience, suggesting an experiential vibrancy to Dasein that is implicit but not thematized in Being and Time. I aim to show that while Heidegger turns away from the term “life” in Being and Time, his understanding of Dasein can still draw on the intensity and immediacy of experience so prominent in this early lecture course.

中文翻译：

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马丁·海德格尔《现象学基本问题》（WS 1919/2020）中生活经验的强度：存在与时间的比较

以下文章将马丁·海德格尔的《存在与时间》与他在 1919/2020 年冬季学期开设的题为“现象学的基本问题”的早期讲座课程进行了比较和对比。海德格尔明确指出，他在《存在与时间》中分析的前现象基础是它们设备总体中的“实体”。他称这些为他分析此在的“初步主题”。虽然对此在的分析是提出存在问题的第一步，但他说，此在分析的前现象基础是“实体”或“设备”。我认为这会导致某些误解，尤其是当他谈到自然和人际关系时。在《基本问题》中，海德格尔关注的不是“实体”或“设备”，而是经验。在这个早期的工作中，他试图开发一种能够捕捉生活体验强度的语言，暗示此在的一种体验活力，这种活力在《存在与时间》中是隐含的但没有主题化。我的目的是表明，虽然海德格尔在《存在与时间》中背离了“生命”这个词，但他对此在的理解仍然可以借鉴这一早期讲座课程中如此突出的经验的强度和直接性。