McDowell motivates a disjunctive conception of experience in the context of other-minds skepticism, but his conception of other minds has been less frequently discussed. In this paper, I focus on McDowell’s perceptual account of others that emphasizes the primitivity of others’ bodily expressivity and his defense of a common-sense understanding of others. And I suggest that Husserl’s subtle analysis of bodily expressivity not only bears fundamental similarities with McDowell’s but also helps to demonstrate the sense in which McDowell’s emphasis on bodily expressivity can remove some of the grounds for other minds skepticism. I argue that the other’s behavioral manifestation is first and foremost perceived in a salient Gestalt and social perception is inherently infused with a constitutive propensity with which we normally take the other as human person in the first place. In this light, I show that Husserl’s account can better elucidate human expressivity and its intrinsic features, thereby helping to remove some of the props of other-minds skepticism. As a result, I believe it proves fruitful to juxtapose McDowell’s and Husserl’s account of bodily expressivity, so as to alternate the Cartesian picture of other-minds that engenders skeptic anxiety and to secure a common-sense understanding of other people.

中文翻译：

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看到他者的思想：麦克道威尔和胡塞尔关于身体表现力和他者思想的问题

麦克道尔在他心怀疑论的背景下激发了一种分离的经验概念，但他对他心的概念很少被讨论。在这篇论文中，我关注 McDowell 对他人的感性描述，他强调他人身体表达的原始性以及他对他人常识性理解的辩护。我认为胡塞尔对身体表现力的微妙分析不仅与麦克道威尔的基本相似，而且有助于证明麦克道尔对身体表现力的强调可以消除其他思想怀疑的一些理由。我认为，他人的行为表现首先是在显着的格式塔中被感知的，而社会感知天生就充满了一种构成性倾向，我们通常首先将他人视为人类。有鉴于此，我表明胡塞尔的解释可以更好地阐明人类的表现力及其内在特征，从而有助于消除其他心智怀疑论的某些支持。因此，我相信将麦克道威尔和胡塞尔对身体表现力的解释并置，以交替笛卡尔式的导致怀疑性焦虑的其他心灵图景，并确保对其他人的常识性理解，证明是富有成效的。从而帮助消除其他思想怀疑论的一些支持。因此，我相信将麦克道威尔和胡塞尔对身体表现力的解释并置，以交替笛卡尔式的导致怀疑性焦虑的其他心灵图景，并确保对其他人的常识性理解，证明是富有成效的。从而帮助消除其他思想怀疑论的一些支持。因此，我相信将麦克道威尔和胡塞尔对身体表现力的解释并置，以交替笛卡尔式的导致怀疑性焦虑的其他心灵图景，并确保对其他人的常识性理解，证明是富有成效的。