In this article I address the idea that in Husserl’s eidetic ontology all possibilities are fixed ‘in advance’ so that actual objects and events—despite their contingency—can only ever unfold possibilities that are ‘permitted’ to them by their essences. I show how this view distorts Husserl’s ontology and argue that this distortion stems from a misconstrual of the relations between essences and facts, and between ideal and real possibilities. These ‘local’ misconstruals reflect, I contend, a ‘global’ misunderstanding that mistakes descriptive distinctions for ‘real’ separations, and that remains indebted to a non-Husserlian understanding of the a priori–a posteriori-distinction. In support of this argument, I first lay out the relevant objection to Husserl’s eidetics as I understand it. Then, I clarify the relation between ideal and real possibilities in the context of Husserl’s eidetics as I see it. Finally, I make a general point about the status of Husserl’s ontological differentiations ‘in the midst of life,’ namely in how what they differentiate is effective and (tacitly) manifest ever only as one moment (amongst many) of the complex whole that is a concrete life of consciousness. I end with some remarks on what this might mean for future phenomenological research on the imagination.

中文翻译：

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生命中的想象力：重新考虑理想和现实可能性之间的关系

在本文中，我提出一个想法，即在胡塞尔的意识形态本体中，所有可能性都是“预先确定”的，因此，实际的对象和事件（尽管具有偶然性）只能展现出其本质“允许”的可能性。我将展示这种观点如何扭曲胡塞尔的本体论，并论证这种扭曲源自对本质与事实之间以及理想与现实可能性之间关系的误解。我认为，这些“局部”的误解反映了一种“全球性”的误解，这种误解是将描述性区分误认为是“真实”分离，并且仍然要归功于非胡塞尔人对先验-后验区分的理解。为了支持这一论点，我首先提出了据我所理解的对胡塞尔思想体系的反对意见。然后，在我所看到的胡塞尔的思想体系中，我阐明了理想和现实可能性之间的关系。最后，我对“生命中”的胡塞尔本体论分化的地位提出了一个总体观点，即它们之间的区别是有效的，并且（隐含地）仅在复杂整体的一瞬间（在许多瞬间）表现出来。意识的具体生活。最后，我想对未来的想象力现象学研究意味着什么。