Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny (Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1999) argue that the pure causal theory of reference faces a problem, which they call the qua - problem . They propose to invoke intentional states to cope with it. Martin Kusch (A sceptical guide to meaning and rules. Acumen, Chesham, 2006), however, argues that, because Devitt and Stereleny invoke intentional states to solve the problem, their causal-hybrid theory of reference is susceptible to Kripke’s sceptical attack. Kusch thinks that intentional states are what allows the sceptic to get a foothold and thus interpret words in a weird way. In his view, Kripke is therefore correct in not regarding a causal theory as a solution to the problem. I think, however, that there is room to defend a causal-hybrid theory of reference. Drawing on Husserl’s notion of the life-world, I argue that this notion is helpful for overcoming some aspects of the qua -problem and the meaning scepticism which Devitt and Sterelny’s causal-hybrid theory of reference faces.

中文翻译：

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该 QUA -问题，意义持怀疑态度，而生活世界

迈克尔·德维特和基姆·斯特尔尼（语言与现实：介绍语言哲学麻省理工学院出版社，剑桥，1999年）认为，参考纯因果理论面临的一个问题，他们称之为 的QUA - 问题 。他们提议援引有意国家来应对。Martin Kusch（对含义和规则的怀疑性指南。Acumen，Chesham，2006年）认为，由于Devitt和Stereleny援引有意国家解决问题，因此他们的因果混合指称理论容易受到Kripke的怀疑性攻击。Kusch认为故意状态可以使怀疑者立足，从而以一种怪异的方式解释单词。因此，他认为，克里普克没有把因果理论视为解决问题的方法是正确的。但是，我认为仍有理由捍卫因果混合参照理论。取材于生活世界胡塞尔的概念，我认为这个概念是克服某些方面有益 QUA 问题和Devitt和Sterelny的因果混合参考理论所面对的意义怀疑论。