I study the forecast updating behavior of Federal Open Market Committee members to assess how individual views on appropriate monetary policy translate into disagreement about the macroeconomic outlook. I match the cross-sectional skewness in interest rates with its inflation and unemployment forecast counterparts and apply standard panel techniques to the data. I observe that hawkish minority voters tend to forecast higher inflation rates relative to the consensus view on the future economy. A higher degree of skewness in the individual inflation forecasts can be attributed mainly to regional Federal Reserve presidents’ minority views on appropriate policy. When investigating potential forecast exaggeration due to strategic motives, however, I find significant differences in the forecast updating behavior neither for Fed governors as opposed to regional Fed presidents nor for members voting with the majority as opposed to voting against the majority nor for stayers and switchers with respect to individual monetary policy stance.

中文翻译：

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联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）的适当货币政策和预期分歧

我研究了联邦公开市场委员会成员的预测更新行为，以评估个人对适当货币政策的看法如何转化为对宏观经济前景的分歧。我将利率的横截面偏斜与通货膨胀和失业预测对应物进行匹配，并将标准面板技术应用于数据。我观察到，鹰派的少数族裔选民倾向于预测相对于对未来经济的共识观点而言更高的通胀率。个人通货膨胀预测中较高的偏度可主要归因于美联储主席对适当政策的少数观点。但是，在调查由于战略动机而导致的潜在预测夸大时，